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general damages in excess of $10,000 and exemplary damages as 
may be assessed by the court" on a second count charging 
negligence in failing to take timely action to have the 
default judgment set aside. (R. p.7), Appellant's Amended 
Complaint is included herewith as Appendix "A". 
On October 11, 1983 the trial court entered 
unopposed judgment against respondent on the issue of 
liability (R. p.57) and thereafter, set the issue of damages 
down for trial. The pleadings upon which interlocutory 
judgment was granted are attached as Appendix ,EBIT. 
On August 12, 1985 final judgment was entered by 
the Honorable Dennis Frederick, Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah against 
Respondent in the sum of $2,250, together with costs in the 
amount of $634,46, after a trial limited, as to respondent, 
to the issue of damages. 
The trial court awarded no damages for the amount 
of the judgment in the underlying case based on his finding 
that: 
16. During the trial plaintiff herein 
adduced no evidence that he had a 
colorable or meritorious defense to the 
allegation Morrison made against him in 
C a s e N o . C - 8 0 - 8 3 0 9 . A c c o r d i n g l y , 
Plaintiff Williams has made no showing 
that had Barber timely filed an answer 
therein, he, W i l l i a m s , could have 
prevailed on the merits. (R. p. 102). 
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On a p p e a l , p l a i n t i f f / a p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t though 
" m e r i t o r i o u s d e f e n s e " i s an e l e m e n t of h i s c a u s e of a c t i o n , 
t h a t e l e m e n t was f u l l y s a t i s f i e d by t h e i n t e r l o c u t o r y 
j u d g m e n t on l i a b i l i t y and t h a t t h e r e f o r e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
f a i l u r e t o i n c l u d e the sum of t he u n d e r l y i n g judgment in t he 
damages awarded a g a i n s t r e s p o n d e n t was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . 
D e f e n d a n t / r e s p o n d e n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t he f i n d i n g s and 
j u d g m e n t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t w e r e c o r r e c t u n d e r t h e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h a t t h e y s h o u l d be a f f i r m e d in a l l 
r e s p e c t s . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
By C o m p l a i n t f i l e d in t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t 
Cour t on O c t o b e r 25 , 1980, C. G r a n t M o r r i s o n and Bonn ie Bruce 
a l l e g e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t had f r a u d u l e n t l y induced them t o e n t e r 
i n t o a c o n t r a c t u n d e r w h i c h t h e y w o u l d , f o r a f e e , b e c o m e 
f r a n c h i s e d i s t r i b u t o r s of an " e n e r g y c o n t r o l m o d u l e " . 
A p p e l l a n t was a l l e g e d t o h a v e a g r e e d t o o r g a n i z e , t r a i n and 
p r o v i d e a s a l e s f o r c e , i n s t a l l and m a i n t a i n t h e m o d u l e s a f t e r 
s a l e , and p r o v i d e s u p p l i e s to t h e f r a n c h i s e s . They p a i d him 
$12,000 but c l a i m s W i l l i a m s f a i l e d t o p e r f o r m . M o r r i s o n and 
B r u c e s o u g h t g e n e r a l and p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s f o r b r e a c h of 
c o n t r a c t and f r a u d . The t r i a l c o u r t took j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of 
t h e f i l e in t h a t c a s e (No. C - 8 0 - 8 3 0 9 in t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t of S a l t L a ke C o u n t y ) f o r p u r p o s e s of t h i s 
a c t i o n . ( T r . p . 1 1 8 ) . 
3 
Appellant contacted Martin Becker, a Las Vegas 
attorney, who referred him to respondent to handle the 
action. Respondent was retained to represent appellant in 
Case No. C-80-8309 by a letter from Becker dated December 29, 
1980. 
An initial Summons in the matter had been served 
upon Williams on or about December 15, 1980, but that Summons 
was defective. An undated but otherwise appropriate second 
Summons was served upon appellant on January 23, 1981. In 
light of the Nevada residence of Williams, an answer was due 
thereon on or before February 23, 1981. 
Respondent failed to file a timely Answer to the 
Complaint. The Answer was not served until March 10, 1981, 
some two weeks after the passage of thirty days from service 
of the Summons. (Tr. p. 116,117). Unknown to the respondent, 
a hearing was held before the Honorable James Sawaya, Third 
Judicial District Judge, on March 4, 1981, which led to the 
entry of judgment against the respondent in the sum of 
approximately $27,000 on March 6, 1981, on the basis of 
default in answering the Complaint. (Tr. p. 121) 
Counsel for Morrison and Bruce gave no notice to 
Williams or the respondent of the entry of the judgment, (Tr. 
p. 120) and took no further action to enforce the judgment 
until the Fall of 1981, when plaintiffs in that action 
garnished the wages of Dalvin Williams. 
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Respondent filed two motions to set aside the 
judgment against Williams, but respondent was discharged 
prior to calling either motion up for hearing. When the 
Motion to Set Aside the judgment was finally heard in the 
early summer of 1982, they were denied by the District Court. 
(Court file in CR-80-8309.) 
Respondent has no substantial disagreement with the 
additional facts contained in appellants Brief, with the 
exception that the allegation contained at Page 7 of 
appellantTs Brief that ". . . a valid defense could have been 
entered on WilliamsT behalf in civil action C-80-8309 . . .TT, 
is not supported by the record and was, in fact, specifically 
rejected by the trial court. (Tr. pp. 138, 139 and R. p. 
102). The only evidence cited by appellant in support of this 
incorrect claim is a single line in the Martin Becker 
deposition (R.38) in which Becker asserts that "as far as I 
was concerned, I felt that the action was defensible" and a 
similar recitation in a brief description of Williams1 view 
of the lawsuit contained in the letter from Martin Becker to 
respondent dated December 29, 1980. The gist of Becker's 
recitation of Williams T position simply was that though he 
had failed to make the payments required by the contract, he 
had done his best to do so and was unable to because the 
business to which the contract was related had failed. 
Respondent respectfully suggests that this is a far cry from 
5 
demonstrating a preponderance of the evidence that Williams 
had good and viable defenses against the underlying Complaint 
upon which he could have prevailed at trial. There is no 
evidence in the record to support any claim that Williams was 
entitled to any setoff against the liability asserted by the 
plaintiffs in the underlying action if, in fact, he had 
violated the contract and was not entitled to payment 
thereunder from Bonnie Bruce. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant has argued that since the Court below 
issued a partial summary judgment finding respondent liable 
for malpractice in having failed to answer a Complaint 
against the appellant herein in an underlying action, that 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff below on the issue of 
liability fully satisfied the legal requirement that 
appellant prove, as a predicate to judgment, that but for the 
negligence of the attorney, appellant would have been able to 
assert a meritorious defense to the underlying act 'on. 
Defendant/respondent respectfully urges the Court 
to reject this argument for the following reasons: 
1. Though the Court has previously held that in 
order to prevail in a legal malpractice action asserting 
negligence in handling underlying litigation, the plaintiff 
must prove at least a reasonable likelihood that but for the 
negligence, he would have prevailed on the merits, this Court 
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has not ruled whether, as a matter of procedure, that fact is 
an element of the cause of action which must be pleaded in 
order to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, or 
whether it is a matter which must be proven, once liability 
has been established, in order to entitle the plaintiff to 
damages. 
2. Since this element was not pleaded as part of 
the plaintiffTs Complaint in this matter, and because the 
Motion for Summary Judgment did not recite this as an element 
of the proof upon which plaintiff/appellant was relying in 
seeking partial judgment on the issue of liability, it would 
be inappropriate to rule that the trial court found that fact 
to have been established as an element of his grant of 
partial summary judgment so as to relieve plaintiff from his 
duty of proving of that element as part of establishing his 
damages. This is especially true where the trial court 
expressly ruled that plaintiff had not met this burden at any 
point in the proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
Because the issues in this case are so integrally 
related, respondent will argue them as a single issue. 
Various states have described the requirements for 
recovery in legal malpractice actions in various ways, but 
the prevailing consensus supports the apparent concession of 
appellant that at the trial level, in order to prevail, 
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a p p e l l a n t w a s r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e ( 1 ) a t t o r n e y / c 1 i e n t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p (2 ) n e g l i g e n c e in h a n d l i n g t h e l i t i g a t i o n and 
( 3 ) d a m a g e s t o t h e c l i e n t p r o x i m a t e l y c a u s e d by t h e 
n e g l i g e n c e of t h e a t t o r n e y . See e .g. Mendoza v. S c h l o s s m a n , 
448 N . Y . S . 2 d 44 ( N Y A p p . D i v . , 1 9 8 2 ) a n d t h e c i t a t i o n s 
p r o v i d e d by a p p e l l a n t . The " p r o x i m a t e c a u s e " e l e m e n t h a s 
been r e d u c e d by many c o u r t s and w r i t e r s to a p p l i c a t i o n of t he 
r u l e t h a t a p l a i n t i f f may n o t c o l l e c t d a m a g e s a g a i n s t h i s 
a t t o r n e y u n l e s s he can show t h a t b u t f o r t h e n e g l i g e n c e of 
t h e a t t o r n e y he w o u l d h a v e s u f f e r e d no d a m a g e s . In t h e 
c o n t e x t of t h i s c a s e , t h e damages a r e a l l e g e d to i n c l u d e f e e s 
p a i d t o o t h e r a t t o r n e y s t o a t t e m p t t o h a v e t h e j u d g m e n t in 
t h e u n d e r l y i n g c a s e s e t a s i d e , and t h e sum of t h e j u d g m e n t 
awarded t h e r e i n . At t h e t r i a l of t h i s c a u s e , J u d g e F r e d e r i c k 
awarded t h e a t t o r n e y T s f e e s bu t r e f u s e d to i n c l u d e t h e amount 
of j udgmen t a w a r d e d a g a i n s t t h e a p p e l l a n t in t h e u n d e r l y i n g 
a c t i o n a f t e r f i n d i n g t h a t t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e t h a t bu t for 
t h e a t t o r n e y ' s n e g l i g e n c e , a p p e l l a n t h e r e c o u l d have a s s e r t e d 
a m e r i t o r i o u s d e f e n s e to t h a t a c t i o n . 
The o n l y U t a h a u t h o r i t y on a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e 
g e n e r a l r u l e in t h i s S t a t e i s found in Young v. Br idwe l 1, 437 
P2d . 686 ( U t a h , 1968) w h e r e t h e p l a i n t i f f had s u e d h e r 
a t t o r n e y f o r h a v i n g f a i l e d t o a d v i s e h e r of h e r r i g h t t o 
a p p e a l from a l o s i n g judgment in t h e t r i a l c o u r t and f a i l i n g 
to p u r s u e such an a p p e a l on he r b e h a l f . The c o u r t ' s l a n g u a g e 
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in addressing the proximate cause issue is as follows: 
The parties are not in disagreement that 
in order to make out a cause of action 
against the attorney for failing to 
advise of [their clients 1] right to 
appeal, it would have to be shown that 
there was at least a reasonable liklihood 
of reversing the judgment and that it 
would have benefitted the plaintiff. 
Though appellant claims to be presenting an issue as to 
whether proximate cause is an element in malpractice actions 
inUtah, he clearly concedes that it is. See lines 1, 2, 23 
and 24 of appellants Brief on appeal. Respondent agrees 
that "proximate cause" must be proven by malpractice 
plaintiffs in order for them to recover, but notes that the 
language of the Rule as set forth in Young v. Br idwel1, 
supra, gives no instruction as to whether, as a matter of 
procedure, the proximate cause element is a s i ne qua non o f 
establishing liability, or whether it is an aspect of proving 
damages once liability has been established. Thus, the 
language of Young v. Bridwell, supra, could be perceived as a 
less precise restatement of the holding of Bird v. Hopkins, 
564 F.Supp. 1425 (U.S.D.C., W.D.Va., 1983) which, by stating 
t h a t -
t e n d s t o 
9 
To r e c o v e r a g a i n s t an a t t o r n e y f o r 
n e g l i g e n c e , a p l a i n t i f f m u s t p r o v e (1) 
t h e a t t o r n e y ' s e m p l o y m e n t ; ( 2 ) h i s 
n e g l e c t of a r e a s o n a b l e d u t y ; and (3 ) 
t h a t such n e g l i g e n c e r e s u l t e d in and was 
t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of t h e p l a i n t i f f T s 
l o s s . ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . 
i n d i c a t e , w i t h o u t s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d i n g , t h a t t h e 
" p r o x i m a t e c a u s e " e l e m e n t i s r e l a t e d t o t h e a s s e s s m e n t of 
damages , r a t h e r t h a n the c a u s e of a c t i o n i t s e l f . S i m i l a r l y , 
G a r g u i 1 l o v . S c h u n k , 395 N . Y . S . 2 d . 7 5 1 (N.Y. A p p . D i v . , 
1977) , h o l d s t h a t -
In order for plaintiff to recover in this 
malpractice action, he must prove facts 
which would enable the jury to find that 
he would have recovered against [the 
defendant] in the underlying action, but 
for his attorneyTs negligence. (Quoting 
Gladden v. Logan, (284 N.Y.S. 2d. 920). 
(Emphas i s added.) 
As with Young and Bird, both supra, this statement of the 
rule apparently does not require the plaintiff to allege and 
prove the "but for" element in order to state a claim, but 
does require that proof as a predicate to recovery of 
damages. 
The I l l i n o i s Cour t of A p p e a l s d i d what in h i n d s i g h t 
a p p e a r s t o be a mor e t h o r o u g h j o b of c l a r i f y i n g t h i s i s s u e in 
B a r t h o l o m e w v. C r o c k e t , 475 N.E. 2nd . 1035 ( 1 1 1 . A p p . , 1 s t 
D i s t . , 1985) by h o l d i n g t h a t an a c t i o n in n e g l i g e n c e a g a i n s t 
an a t t o r n e y does not a c c u r e u n l e s s t h e u n d e r l y i n g a c t i o n was 
d e f e n s i b l e b e c a u s e : 
S i n c e ^£EBj*gj: * s a n i:JLiL[I}.£IlJL ° f a 
p r o f e s s i o n a l m a l p r a c t i c e c l a i m . . . 
[ p l a i n t i f f ] b e a r s t h e b u r d e n of p l e a d ing 
a n d p r o v i n g t h a t . . . ' b u t f o r 1 t h e 
a t t o r n e y ' s n e g l i g e n c e , t h e c l i e n t w o u l d 
h a v e s u c c e s s f u l l y d e f e n d e d . . . t h e 
u n d e r l y i n g s u i t . ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . 
(Emphas i s a d d e d . ) 
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T h i s s t a t e m e n t of t h e R u l e i s s u p e r i o r t o a l l o t h e r s c i t e d 
above b e c a u s e i t i n c l u d e s a s i n g l e e l e m e n t w h i c h , had i t been 
e n u n c i a t e d by t h e U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t , m i g h t h a v e r i d us of 
t h e a m b i g u i t y w h i c h d i r e c t l y l e d t o t h e p r o b l e m s w h i c h 
p roduced t h i s a p p e a l . 
T h e w o r d " a m b i g u i t y " i s u s e d t o d e s c r i b e t h e 
p r o b l e m b e c a u s e t h o u g h t h e r e c o r d in t h i s c a s e d e m o s t r a t e s 
t h a t p l a i n t i f f s Amended C o m p l a i n t a l l e g e s (1) t h e e x i s t e n c e 
of a n a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s u p p o r t e d by 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n , (2 ) t h e e x i s t e n c e of d u t y , (3 ) n e g l i g e n c e in 
f a i l i n g to answer and (4) damages a r i s i n g from t h e r e s u l t i n g 
j u d g m e n t , t h e C o m p l a i n t d o e s n o t a l l e g e t h a t a p p e l l a n t had 
m e r i t o r i o u s d e f e n s e s t o t h e u n d e r l y i n g c a s e or t h a t "bu t f o r " 
t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s n e g l i g e n c e in f a i l i n g t o f i l e a t i m e l y 
a n s w e r , t h e p l a i n t i f f would not have p r e v a i l e d anyway. (R., 
p p . 5 - 7 0 ) . S i m i l a r l y , a p p e l l a n t ' s M o t i o n f o r Summary 
J u d g m e n t on t h e I s s u e of L i a b i l i t y and t h e m e m o r a n d u m in 
s u p p o r t t h e r e o f , a l l e g e t h a t t h e m o t i o n s h o u l d be g r a n t e d 
b e c a u s e (1) r e s p o n d e n t was r e t a i n e d and p a i d t o d e f e n d 
a p p e l l a n t in t h e u n d e r l y i n g a c t i o n , (2) t h a t he t h e r e f o r had 
a d u t y t o f i l e a t i m e l y a n s w e r and (3) t h a t a s a r e s u l t of 
h i s f a i l u r e t o do s o , a d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t w a s e n t e r e d . 
T h e r e f o r e , i m p l i e s t h e p l e a d i n g , " t h e r e i s no m a t e r i a l f a c t 
a s t o l i a b i l i t y and t h e p l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o s u m m a r y 
j u d g m e n t on t h a t i s s u e , a s a m a t t e r of l a w . " (R. p p . 2 5 - 2 8 ) . 
11 
Once again, the pleading fails to allege either that the 
underlying ease was subject to any meritorious defense or 
that "but for" the negligence of respondent, judgment would 
not ultimately have been entered therein even if an answer 
had been timely filed. All plaintiff claimed to be entitled 
to by this pleading was judgment to the effect that 
respondent owed a duty to appellant and had been negligent in 
failing to discharge it timely, thus entitling him, without 
more, to the relief sought by his Complaint, to wit; "Special 
damages [and out-of-pocket expenses] as proven at trial." A 
reasonable reading of these pleadings is that plaintiff 
deliberately intended to leave proof of the sum of money 
deemed adequate by the trial court to compensate plaintiff 
for the losses wh ich he could prove were prox imately caused 
by respondent!s negligence, for the trial on the issue of 
damages. This language also permitted respondent and the 
Court to assume that at the trial as to damages, appellant 
would adduce (for the first time) his proofs as to what 
damages he would have suffered "but for" the negligence of 
respondent. Under Young v. Br idwel 1, supra, that analysis of 
the thrust of plaintiffs Judgment on the issue of Liability 
was entirely justified. 
That analysis, which was apparently shared alike by 
plaintiff, his counsel, respondent and the trial court, is 
also bolstered by case law from other jurisdictions. An 
12 
a n n o t a t i o n which by i t s t i t l e p l a c e s the " p r o x i m a t e c a u s e " or 
" b u t f o r " a n a l y s i s in t h e a r e a of d a m a g e s r a t h e r t h a n as an 
e l e m e n t of l i a b i l i t y , i s f o u n d a t 45 A . L . R . 2 d . 6 2 , 
A n n o t a t i o n : "Measure and E l e m e n t s of Damages R e c o v e r a b l e for 
A t t o r n e y ' s N e g l i g e n c e w i t h R e s p e c t t o M a i n t e n a n c e o r 
P r o s e c u t i o n of L i t i g a t i o n or A p p e a l " , w h i c h a n n o t a t e s 
P e t e v. H e n d e r s o n , 269 P2d. 78 ( C a l . 1954) w h i c h r e v e r s e d a 
j u d g m e n t l i m i t i n g d a m a g e s a g a i n s t an a t t o r n e y who had 
s u b j e c t e d h i s c l i e n t t o c o n t i n u i n g l i a b i l i t y on a f i n a l 
j u d g m e n t by f a i l i n g t o f i l e a t i m e l y n o t i c e of a p p e a l , t o t h e 
amount p a i d as f ees to the a t t o r n e y . In r e v e r s i n g , t h e c o u r t 
h e l d t h a t t h e c l i e n t mus t " p l e a d and p r o v e " t h a t t h e a p p e a l , 
had i t been t a k e n , would have r e s u l t e d in r e v e r s a l , bu t h o l d s 
t h a t i f he d o e s s o , t h e a m o u n t of t h e u n d e r l y i n g j u d g m e n t may 
be i n c l u d e d in t h e damage a w a r d a g a i n s t t h e a t t o r n e y . The 
i m p r o p e r l y l i m i t e d judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t was r e v e r s e d 
and t h e c a s e was r e m a n d e d f o r new t r i a l . The m a i n r e a s o n t h e 
j u d g m e n t w a s n ' t s i m p l y a f f i r m e d w a s t h a t t h e 
p l a i n t i f f / a p p e l l a n t had p r o c e e d e d in p r o p r i a p e r s o n a in t he 
t r i a l c o u r t b e c a u s e no one would r e p r e s e n t h im. L a t e r c a s e s 
r e p o r t e d in ALR L a t e r Case S e r v i c e , S u p p l e m e n t i n g 44-48 ALR 
2 d , p p 1 2 4 - 1 2 5 , a r e i n a c c o r d w i t h t h e r u l e c i t e d in 
P e t e v. H e n d e r s o n , s u p r a , and t h e a n n o t a t i o n which f o l l o w s . 
T h a t J u d g e F r e d e r i c k v i e w e d t h e " p r o x i m a t e c a u s e " 
i s s u e in t h i s c a s e a s o n e r e l a t e d t o d a m a g e s a n d n o t 
13 
liability is made abundantly clear in his findings of fact 
(R.102), where in successive paragraphs he finds that 
plaintiff/appellant had not shown that he had a colorable or 
meritorious defense or that he could have prevailed had the 
answer been timely filed (Para. 16), but that Williams did 
pay lawyers $1,750 to attempt to set the judgment aside. 
From those findings of fact, Judge Frederick concluded that 
the attorney's fees were incurred as a proximate result of 
respondent's negligence, but that the sum of the underlying 
judgment was not. 
By this time plaintiff/appel Iant had not only 
failed to plead that he had any defense to the underlying 
suit in his Complaint, and failed to urge it as an element of 
his unopposed claim for partial summary judgment, but had 
also failed to establish it by persuasive evidence at trial. 
Appellant's counsel now claims that though evidence 
supporting this requirement was never adduced, we should 
pretend that it was introduced as part of the judgment on the 
issue of liability. What his counsel is really saying to 
this Court is: "Let's not, but say we did." If, as counsel 
now concedes, "meritorious defense" is a fundamental element 
of the cause of action, then plaintiff should have been 
required to plead and prove it as a pre-condition to the 
award of partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. 
No such requirement was imposed because respondent and the 
14 
trial court all took the position amply supported by 
Young v, B r i dwe 1 1, supra, and the cases from many other 
jurisdictions, that the partial summary judgment merely ruled 
that as a matter of fact and law, respondent had been 
negligent in his performance of a duty to appellant and 
should be held accountable for such damages as might, at the 
trial on the issue of damages, be proven to have been 
proximately caused by that negligence. At that later trial, 
appellant proved that but for respondent's negligence he 
would not have had to pay attorneys to attempt to set aside 
the judgment, but did not prove that had respondent filed a 
timely answer, the plaintiff in the underlying case would not 
have prevailed anyway. Thus, the sum of the judgment was not 
awarded to him as damages. 
For this Court to permit the trial court and the 
respondent to be induced by the pleadings and actions of 
appellants trial counsel to try the entire case and impose 
judgment on a well founded legal basis, then obtain a $27,000 
judgment on a materially different, shadow legal basis never 
operative at the trial level, and not clearly based on 
applicable precedents, would be patently unfair. The trial 
judge clearly found that the c[e min imus evidence claimed on 
appeal to have satisfied the "proximate cause" requirement 
for p u r p o s e s of the p a r t i a l s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t was 
insufficient. (Tr. p. 138: R. p. 102, paragraph 16.) He 
15 
a l s o c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d h i s v i e w , e n t i r e l y p r o p e r as a m a t t e r 
of p r o c e d u r e u n d e r e x i s t i n g a u t h o r i t y , t h a t t h e p a r t i a l 
j u d g m e n t of l i a b i l i t y r e f l e c t e d o n l y a f i n d i n g t h a t 
r e s p o n d e n t h a d a d u t y t o a p p e l l a n t w h i c h h e h a d b e e n 
n e g l i g e n t in p e r f o r m i n g , l e a v i n g t h e i s s u e of p r o x i m a t e c a u s e 
a s t o any of t h e t h r e e t y p e s of d a m a g e s c l a i m e d , t o be 
r e s o l v e d a t t h e t r i a l on damages . D u r i n g h i s o r a l r u l i n g t h e 
t r i a l cour t s a i d : 
W i t h r e g a r d t o B a r b e r , I f i n d t h a t t h e 
l a t e f i l i n g of t h e a n s w e r and t h e f a i l u r e 
t o t i m e l y move t o s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t 
j u d g m e n t on b e h a l f of t h e p l a i n t i f f 
was neg l i 'gent and c o n s t i t u t e s t h e r e f o r e , 
t h e t o r t o f 1 e g a 1 ma 1p r ac t i c e , w h i c h 
f i nd i ng s u p p o r t s t h e g r a n t ing of t h e 
p a r t i a l summary j u d g m e n t by t h i s C o u r t 
a g a i n s t Mr . B a r b e r on t h e 1 1 t h of 
O c t o b e r , 1 9 8 3 , w h i c h w a s g r a n t e d by 
d e f a u l t . ( T r . p p . 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 . ) 
Were t h i s Cour t t o be p e r s u a d e d by t h e a r g u m e n t of 
a p p e l l a n t , t h e r e s u l t w o u l d b e t h e e n t r y of a $ 2 7 , 0 0 0 
j u d g m e n t in f a v o r of p l a i n t i f f / a p p e l l a n t w i t h o u t h i s e v e r 
p r o v i n g t h a t t h e u n d e r l y i n g damages were t h e p r o x i m a t e r e s u l t 
of r e s p o n d e n t s n e g l i g e n c e . N e i t h e r t h e a p p l i c a b l e c a s e law 
nor t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of f u n d a m e n t a l f a i r n e s s s u p p o r t s u c h a 
r e s u l t . 
16 
CONCLUSION 
For t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d , r e s p o n d e n t r e q u e s t s t h e 
C o u r t t o a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t in a l l 
r e s p e c t s . 
Da ted t h i s /^tf^P day of March, 1986. 
'-CAU^ 
JAME3 N. BERBER, Pro Se 
2/5 East 400 South, #100 
/alt Lake City, Utah 84111 
'elephone: (801) 355-8998 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Defendant and Respondent were 
mailed, postage prepaid, to Mr. Eric Taylor, 600 S. Eighth 
Street, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101, on this **{th day of April, 
1986. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE Or UTAH 
DALVIN J. WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN 
VERHOEF and DAVID E. YOCUM, 
partners in the law firm of 
BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCUM, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 82-4887 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Defendants are, and at all times hereinafter mention4 
were, attorneys at law licensed in the State of Utah with their 
practice in Salt Lake City, Utah, holding themselves out as 
partners with offices in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Defendant JAMES N. BARBER is a partner in said law 
firm. 
3. On or about the 15th day of December, 1980 Plaintiff 
was duly served with a Summons and Complaint in Civil Action No. 
C-80-8309 filed in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah brought by C. Grant Morrison and 
Bonnie Bruce to recover the principal sum of $12,000.00 for an 
alleged breach of contract. 
4. On or about the 2nd day of January, 1981, Plaintiff 
by reference through his attorney in Clark County, Nevada, and the 
payment of $500.00 in advance, retained JAMES N. BARBER of Defen-
dants' firm as his attorney to answer in Civil Action No. C-80-
8109. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
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29 
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5. Defendants accepted the retainer of $500.00 and 
undertook to defend the Plaintiff in Civil Action Ko. C-80-S309. 
6. By reason of the employment of Defendants, said 
Defendants had a duty to interpose an Answer and further represent 
the Plaintiff in the said civil action; 
7. Defendants negligently failed to interpose an Answer 
to said Complaint and by reason thereof, on or about the 16th day 
of Karch, 1981, a default judgment amounting to approximately 
$27,000.00 was entered against the Plaintiff. 
8. On account of said judgment, Plaintiff has suffered 
a levy upon his salary of approximately $880.00, 
9. As a direct of Defendants' negligence, Plaintiff has 
further suffered the loss of his employment; great embarrassment, 
humiliation and emotional distress; and general damages of 
$250,000.00; 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plaintiff, by this reference herein, repleads the 
allegations of the First Cause of Action herein as if fully set 
forth in hec verba. 
2. Plaintiff upon learning of the default judgment 
against him in Civil Action No. C-80-8309 attempted to have 
Defendants initiate proceedings to have the judgment vacated or 
set aside. 
3. Defendants were negligent in prosecuting Plaintiff's 
motion for relief from said default judgment; therefore, said 
motion was denied; 
4. Plaintiff was forced to, and did incur expenses 
amounting to large sums of money, in the proceedings attempting to 
have said judgment vacated and set aside; 
5. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants' 
negligence, Plaintiff is liable upon a judgment of approximately 
$27,000.00 and has suffered special damages herein alleged together 
with general damages in excess of $10,000.00. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against the 
Defendants as follows: 
First Cause of Action 
1. General dmaages of $250,000.00 
2. Special damages as proven at the time of 
trial; 
Second Cause of Action 
1. Special damages and out-of-pocket expenses as 
proven at the time of trial; 
2. General damages in excess of $10,000.00; 
3. Exemplary damages as may be assessed by 
the Court; 
4. Costs incurred in this action; 
DATED this £3 day of June, 1982. 
MONTE J./MORRIS, ESQUIRE 
Attorneyv£or Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 843 
Henderson, NV 89015 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
/ | / 0 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
DALVIN J. WILLIAMS, ) 
1
 ) 
\ Plaintiff, ) 
1 V 1
 vs. ) 
i \ 
JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN ) 
VERHOEF and DAVID E. YOCOM ) 
,partners in the law firm of ) 
,BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCOM, ) 
1
 Defendants. ) 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY 
Civil No. 82-4887 
16, COMES NOW the Plaintiff, DALVIN J. WILLIAMS, by and 
17 i through his attorney of record herein, and respectfully moves the 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Court to enter Summary Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendants and each of them, as to liability only. 
This motion is based upon the pleadings and papers 
heretofore filed in this action, the Points and Authorities and 
Exhibits filed herewith and all other pertinent matters adduced 
at the time of hearing. 
DATED this //) "~day of August 1983. 
MORRIS AND GORMAN 
<&^£*^? 
MONTE J. M0R£IS, ESQUIRE 
Attorney fbr Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 843 
Henderson, NV 89015 
NOTICE OF MOTION 
TO: JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN VERHOEF and DAVID E. YOCOM, Defendants; 
YOU AND EACH OF YOU PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the A ^ 
1 ' cay of QjLLCyLi~<±- £~ , 1983, at the hour of 9 ' OC) o'clock 
2 a.m. at the Courts Building, 200 East Fourth South, Salt Lake 
3 City, Utah, the Plaintiff will bring the foregoing motion on for 
4 hearing before the Court. 
51 DATED this /ff-^day of August, 1983. 
6! MORRIS AND GORMAN 
^^^^^y^^^^^ 7 
MONTE J. M0R^1S, ESQUIRE 
9 II Attorney fbf Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 843 
10/ Henderson, NV 89015 
ii 
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12 . POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
i 
13'j I 
l| 
14 j NATURE OF ACTION 
15 
16 
17 
This is an action in tort for the alleged negligent 
malpractice of the defendants in failing to perform their contract 
of employnenc to defend the plaintiff, DALVIN WILLIAMS, in a 
18! civil action in which the said DALVIN WILLIAMS was a defendant. 
19 , II 
20 
21 
22 
23 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In October of 1980, C. GRANT MORRISON and BONNIE BRUCE 
as Plaintiffs, filed a lawsuit against DALVIN WILLIAMS as a 
defendant in the Third Judicial District Court alleging breach of 
24' contract. Said civil action was designated number C-80-8309. The 
i 
251 defendant, DALVIN WILLIAMS, who then resided in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
26 was served by extra-territorial process in the State of Nevada. 
I 
27!' Upon notice of the pending lawsuit, Mr. WILLIAMS consulted Martin 
I1 
23 Becker, Esquire, an attorney in Las Vegas, Nevada concerning a 
29 
30 
31 
possible defense to the Utah action. Martin Becker referred the 
case to JAMES BARBER of the law firm of BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCOM 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Becker tendered a retainer of $500.00 
32 ' on Mr. WILLIAMS' behalf. JAMES BARBER accepted the retainer and 
l' undertook the representation of the defendant DALVIN J. WILLIAMS 
2 in the pending lawsuit. Mr. BARBER did not timely file an 
3 Answer or otherwise plead; therefore, the Plaintiffs, MORRISON 
4 1 and BRUCE, took judgment against the defendant WILLIAMS by default 
5| JAMES BARBER prepared a motion to set aside the judgment; however, 
6* this motion, much like the Answer, was not timely filed or 
7| diligently prosecuted. Therefore, the default judgment was allowed 
81 to stand. JAMES BARBER was negligent in his representation of 
9 DALVIN WILLIAMS. DALVIN WILLIAMS has sued the firm of BARBER, 
10 '• VERHOEF 5c Y0C0M on account of their holding out as partners. 
II 
nil in 
12 • LEGAL BASIS FOR PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
i ~ 
1 3 it 1. Summary judgment may be rendered on the issue of 
14 ;| liability alone, although there is a genuine issue as to the amount 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
of damages. U.R.C.P. 56(c). 
2. A general holding out as partners creates a 
partnership by estoppel. UCA 48-1-13. 
3. JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN VERHOEF and DAVID Y0C0M 
have held themselves out as partners in the following ways: 
a) listed in Martindale-Hubbell as BARBER, VERHOEF 
& YOCOM; 
b) licensed as BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCOM with the 
City of Salt Lake City, since 1978; 
c) listed in Salt Lake City metropolitan telephone 
25|lbook as BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCOM; 
l| 
261| d) stationery letterhead and legal paper imprinted 
27 with BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCOM; 
28 I e) pleadings designated BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCOM. 
29 
30 
31 j 
32, 
4. The acts of a partner in the usual course of business 
binds the partnership and creates a partnership liability. 
UCA 48-1-12. See also UCA 78-21-59. 
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IV 
FACTUAL BASIS FOR PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
1. JAMES BARBER of the law firm of BARBER, VERHOEF & 
YOCOM was retained to represent DALVIN WILLIAMS in Civil Case 
No. C-80-8309. [See Exhibit 1, Page 4] 
2. JAMES BARBER accepted employment and undertook the 
representation and defense of DALVIN WILLIAMS. [See Exhibit 1 
Page 7 ] . 
3. JAMES BARBER accepted a retainer fee of $500.00. 
[See Exhibit 1, Page 7]. 
4. JAMES BARBER failed to file an Answer or otherwise 
defend DALVIN WILLIAMS. [See Exhibit 1, Page 13]. 
5. Judgment was entered against DALVIN WILLIAMS on 
account of JAMES BARBER's failure to interpose an Answer or other-
wise defend. [See Civil Case No. C-80-8309]. That judgment is 
a viable, subsisting judgment agianst the said DALVIN WILLIAMS. 
6. There is no issue of material fact as to liability, 
therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on that 
issue, as a matter of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORRIS AND GORMAN 
MONTE J. MORRlsT" ESQUIRE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 843 
Henderson, NV 89015 
RECEIPT OF A COPY of the foregoing Motion tor Jx 
Judgment on the Is^sue^ of Liability is acknowledged this 
^ ^ 
[fary 
day of 
ZERHOEF &. YOCOM 
JAMES N. BARBER 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
l!i CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
2 I hereby certify that on the /^L day of August, 1983 
'! 
3 ' I did deposit in the United States Post Office at Henderson, 
I 
41 Nevada, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Motion for 
5 SuTiDary Judgnent as to Liability, addressed as follows: 
! 
61 James N. Barber, Esq. 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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TASSY WOLFE, an employee or 
MORRIS AND C0R.MAX 
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